Last Clear Chance in Colorado by Saviers, John D.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 28 Issue 4 Article 6 
June 2021 
Last Clear Chance in Colorado 
John D. Saviers 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
John D. Saviers, Last Clear Chance in Colorado, 28 Dicta 140 (1951). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
DICTA
LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN COLORADO
JOHN D. SAVIERS
of the Denver Bar*
What does the phrase last clear chance mean as defined by
Colorado law? If this phrase leads one to believe that there is
a separate and distinct right available against a negligent per-
son who had the last clear chance to avoid an injury, then it is a
misnomer. There is not under Colorado law a separate right of
recovery based on last clear chance. There is only one right of
recovery available where last clear chance is involved, and that right
is based on simple negligence alone. The phrase last clear chance
comes into the picture only as a description of the facts of the case.
The Colorado courts for the last fifteen years have very
pointedly shown that a person shall at all times exercise a reason-
able degree of care toward others. The rule has been clearly laid
down that a person may not escape liability for a negligent act
created by himself where that act was a breach of a duty owing
the plaintiff, and where the act was the legal proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury.
The rule as set out above may be traced through Colorado deci-
sions starting with Independent Lumber Co. v. Leatherwood.1 In
this case the plaintiff stopped at a stop sign, looked to his left and
saw a truck some 400 to 475 feet away. He then put his car in
gear and proceeded to make a left turn on to the street toward
the approaching truck. When the plaintiff had completed about
one half of his turn, the defendant struck him, causing bodily in-
jury and damage to his car. The court in holding for the plaintiff
said :2
Clearly plaintiff bases his right of recovery on injuries negli-
gently inflicted on him by defendant. A failure to exercise ordinary
care for another's safety which operates as the proximate cause of
injury to the latter, is the legal theory on which recovery is per-
mitted in negligence cases.
Here the court, without quibbling, pointed out that the plain-
tiff's right of recovery was predicated on the negligence theory
alone, and that the last clear chance rule applies for purpose of
determining the legal proximate cause of the injury. The court
went on to say :3
The rule of last clear chance is one to be applied for the analysis
or resolution of an extended fact situation into at least two fact
situations, one of which includes the acts and omissions of the plain-
tiff that create the condition under which an injury occurs and this
- Written while a student at the University ot Denver College of Law.
1102 Colo. 460, 79. P. 2d 1052 (1938).




becomes merely a remote cause of it; the other including the acts
and omissions of the parties subsequent to the creation of the situa-
tion, from which the proximate cause of the injury is to be asceer-
tained.
The last clear chance rule is a method applied to analyze,
resolve, or describe a factual situation-a method by which the
acts of the plaintiff and the defendant can both be better explained.
The factual situation described by the rule requires that the plain-
tiff must be in a position of impending peril created by his own
negligence, and it is required that the defendant could or should
have discovered plaintiff's position.
In the above case the plaintiff was admittedly negligent by
not allowing the defendant truck driver the right of way as re-
quired by city ordinance. He did not see the truck from the time
it was 400 feet away until he was hit. An analysis of plaintiff's
position shows that he was in a situation of inextricable peril cre-
ated by his negligent act.
The defendant admitted that he was driving approximately 25
mlies per hour, and that he had an unobstructed view ahead of
him. Evidence was presented proving that the defendant had
ample time once the plaintiff had pulled into the street to stop his
truck and avoid the injury. The defendant, therefore, could have
discovered the plaintiff's position if he had used reasonable care
in keeping a proper lookout. If the reasonably prudent man test
is used, it must be found that the defendant was negligent and in
breach of a duty owing the plaintiff. The defendant could have
foreseen that his failure to keep a proper lookout for the plaintiff,
where in fact he was in the position to do so, was negligent. The
defendant could have discovered the plaintiff's impending peril,
and it was his independent and unbroken negligent act that was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
MUST PROVE JUST As ANY OTHER FACT
In any cause of action the plaintiff bears the burden of prov-
ing the facts of the case. Last clear chance is a factual situation
that must be proved the same as any other fact. Dwinelle v. Union
Pacific R.R.,4 brings out this point. The plaintiff in this case had
been driving parallel to the railroad. His view of the tracks was
obstructed by a frosted windshield and by the bed of the truck
which blocked the side window of the cab. Because of plaintiff's
obstructed view, he at no time saw the approaching railroad car;
therefore, he had put himself in a position of inextricable peril.
The defendant was driving at normal speed and had given the
proper signal for highway crossings. Evidence was offered that
the defendant had seen the plaintiff before he had started on to
the tracks; and that he did not attempt to stop the railroad car
4104 Colo. 545, 92 P. 2d 741 (1939).
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until he had actually seen the defendant start on to the tracks.
By that time it was too late to avoid the collision. Evidence also
was presented showing that there was a split second possibility
that the defendant could have avoided the injury. This evidence,
however, was not sufficient to sustain plaintiff's burden of proof.
The court in holding for the defendant said, "the doctrine of last
clear chance applies only where plaintiff's negligence is admitted,
and he (plaintiff) has the burden of proving it (i.e. last clear
chance) as any other fact."
As to this particular case the court said:
it must be admitted that if the impending peril in which the parties
found themselves was due entirely to the negligence of Perry and
Dwinelle (drivers of truck) and yet was discovered by Finn (driver
of railroad car), or, in the exercise of reasonable care, ought to have
been discovered by him in time to avert the accident, the doctrine
applies and the cause should have gone to the jury as against the
company.
Once the plaintiff has sustained this burden of proof, then
it is the duty of the jury to consider all of the facts presented, and
from these facts determine the legal proximate cause of the injury.5
The Supreme Court in Denver Tramway Corp. v. Perisho 6 over-
ruled the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in its
instruction to the jury relative to the last clear chance rule. The
defendant claimed that the rule could not be applied in this case
because in fact the plaintiff's negligence was continuously active
up to the time of the injury. Therefore, since the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent, the last clear chance rule was not avail-
able. The court held that the rule was applicable only when the
defendant and plaintiff were both negligent. And where there
was evidence that both parties had been negligent, then it was
proper for such facts to be presented to the jury for their con-
sideration. Evidence of contributory negligence does not preclude
the use of the last clear chance rule; instead such evidence becomes
a part of the facts to be presented along with all other facts for
the jury's determination.
COLORADO FOLLOWS RESTATEMENT
The Colorado courts have found that Section 479 of the Re-
statement of Torts properly describes the last clear chance rule.'
A quick breakdown of that section reveals that the right of recov-
ery under the rule is based on negligence, with the limitation that
the rule is not applicable unless there is a specific factual situation
1 Denver Tramway Corp. v. Perisho, 105 Colo. 280 (1939) ; Lambrecht v. Archibald,
119 Col. 356 (1949) ; Woods v. Siegrist, 112 Colo. 257 (1944).
.Supra.
'Independent Lumber Co. v. Leatherwood, Supra, note 1 ; Lambrecht v. Archibald,
Supra, note 5 ; Woods v. Siegrist, Supra, note 5; Pueblo Transportation Co. v. Moylan,
121 Colo ..... 1950-51 CBA Advance Sheet 184 (No. 9).
DICTA Vol. 28
April, 1951
in evidence.8 The Restatement, therefore,.is in accord with the
Colorado rule. It allows recovery based on negligence alone, and
it makes the use of the rule available only when a specific factual
situation is present.
The last clear chance rule in Colorado has been made simple
and useful. The rule provides a means of presenting a compli-
cated factual situation in a simple manner. We see from the
Colorado decisions that the last clear chance rule is a factual situ-
ation that must be proved the same as all other facts, a factual
situation that must go along with all other facts to the jury for
their determination. A person seeking recovery under the rule
does not-have a separate and distinct cause of action; instead he
has a cause of action based on negligence alone.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT DIGEST
TIMOTHY WOOLSTON*
By passing the Federal Tort Claims Act 1 in 1946, the United
States has, with certain exceptions to be noted later, consented to
waive her immunity from suits founded in tort. To appreciate
the full significance of the Tort Claims Act, an understanding of
what has gone before is essential.
Prior to 1887, the private relief bills presented to Congress
were the sole means by which a person could satisfy a tort claim
against the United States. The time consuming work resulting
from the consideration of all of these private bills finally prompted
Congress to pass the Tucker Act 2 in 1887. The Tucker Act was
directed at this congestion in Congress and it did alleviate some
of the distress by extending the jurisdiction of the district courts
to include claims for less than $10,000 where such claims were
founded upon the Constitution, a Federal statute, an executive
regulation, or a contract to which the United States was a party.
Because ordinarily, simple tortious conduct is infrequently based
upon a statute or regulation, the Tucker Act did nothing to rid
Congress of the hundreds of claims that were based upon the simple
torts of government agents.
5 Section 479 Restatement of Torts: A plaintiff who has negligently subjected him-
self to a risk of harm from the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm
caused thereby if, immediately preceding the harm, (a) the defendant (i) knows of
the plaintiff's situation and realizes the helpless peril involved therein; or (ii) knows
of the plaintiff's situation and had reason to realize the peril involved therein; or (ill)
would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and thus had reason to realize the plain-
tiff's helpless peril had he exercised the vigilance which it was his duty to the plaintiff
to exercise ...
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
62 Stat. 992, 28 U.S.C. secs. 1346 (b), 1402 (b), 2401 (b), 2402, 2411, 2412 (b),
2671-2680 (1950). All section references are to Title 28 U.S.C. unless otherwise indi-
cated.'Sec. 1246 (a) (2).
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